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THE NECESSARY APPLICATION OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE TO CASES INVOLVING
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND GROUP
FAMILY DAY CARE HOMES
Heidi Marie Flinn *
INTRODUCTION
Consider a woman who purchased a condominium ten years ago.
To earn extra money, this woman now wishes to start caring for
three or four children in her home during the day. Word gets out
around the building. The neighbors approach the woman to see if
they can persuade her not to operate the day care in the neighbor-
hood because of the extra noise and traffic it would bring. The
operator of the new day care understands their concerns, but she
persists in opening the new day care because of her financial situa-
tion. The neighbors file suit to enjoin the woman from beginning
her day care business because it violates a clause in the condomin-
ium's bylaws that limits the property to residential use only as a
single family dwelling.'
The operator of the day care home argues that she is not violat-
ing the terms in the restrictive covenant,2 and, even if she is, the
restrictive covenant cannot be enforced because it violates public
policies manifested in a variety of state statutes.3 The operator
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., The Ohio
State University, 1998. I would like to extend my appreciation to Professor James
Kainen for his valuable insight and advice.
1. See, e.g., Quinones v. Board of Managers, 673 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1998)
(deciding whether owners of a condominium were entitled to an injunction barring
the board of managers from taking action against their group family day care home.
The ownership agreement contained a clause that stated "[t]he use for which the Unit
is intended is residential occupancy, provided that, subject to all applicable govern-
mental laws and regulations, any residential Unit may be used as a professional office
if the owner thereof resides therein.").
2. See Dirk Hubbard, Group Homes and Restrictive Covenants, 57 U. Mo.-K.C.
L. REv. 135, 138 (1988) (citing cases in several jurisdictions, including Missouri, North
Carolina, Texas, and Colorado, that find group homes for the mentally retarded con-
stitute a residential use).
3. See Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group,
460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984) (considering section 41.34(f) of New York's Mental Hy-
giene Law that states "[a] community residence established pursuant to this section
and family care homes shall be deemed a family unit, for purposes of local laws and
ordinances").
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cites many cases where the court denied enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant due to public policies favoring operation of group
homes for the mentally ill.4 In response, the neighbors argue that
the operator is violating the terms of the restrictive covenant, and
that the state cannot override the covenant, a private contract, un-
less there is a compelling state interest, which does not exist here.
This scenario illustrates some of the issues that arise when re-
strictive covenants clash with a state's public policy and raises the
question of whether, and to what extent, state statutes and judicial
imposition of public policy may legitimately interfere with private
contractual rights. When courts address whether to deny enforce-
ment of a restrictive covenant as it applies to a group family day
care home, a legitimate constitutional issue is not being addressed.
State courts are not applying the Contract Clause analysis that is
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Energy Reserves
Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co.5 to determine whether the
denial of enforcement of the covenant is constitutional. When
group homes for the mentally ill are involved,6 some state courts
have held that the states have an interest in promoting the deinsti-
tutionalization of the mentally ill and, thus, can deny enforcement
of private contracts. Although the results in these cases may be
appropriate, the analysis many courts use to reach their holdings is
problematic. Only when state legislation prevents enforcement of
the covenant against group homes have courts fully recognized that
there is a question about the constitutionality of the state's action.
Nonetheless, in the more typical situation, courts have denied en-
forcement in the absence of such legislation. Relying on common
law judicial power to deny enforcement of covenants against public
policy as reflected in related (but not controlling) statutes, those
courts have most often failed to acknowledge any constitutional di-
mension to their decisions.
In addition, even if the Contract Clause analysis is being applied,
it is not being applied correctly because courts are employing pub-
lic policy in support of group homes for the mentally ill to support
4. See id.; see also Craig v. Bossenbery, 351 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Mental Health and Mental Retardation Servs. v. Kinnear, 877
S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
5. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
6. This Note will look to many cases involving group homes for the mentally ill
because they are more numerous than cases involving group day care homes for chil-
dren. Suits over group homes for the mentally ill are also useful precedent because
they provide a more complete background of the public policy surrounding these
cases and also of the Contract Clause application.
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homes for family day care. Courts should recognize the policies
behind family day care independently of the policies in favor of
deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill and then determine whether
the state has a significant interest in regulating family day care.
This Note argues that courts should apply the Contract Clause
analysis7 that is set forth by the Supreme Court in Energy Reserves
to all home based day care cases regardless of whether it is state
legislative or judicial action that prevents enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant.' The conclusion is significant as litigation shifts
from group homes to home based day care. Whether the latter are
permissible may well depend upon whether courts conceive that
they must pass the constitutional test or merely find support in
public policy. Applying Energy Reserves to these cases allows both
the interests of the operators of the group family day care and the
interests of the surrounding property owners who are subject to the
same restrictive covenants to be considered.9 In addition, adopting
the Supreme Court's rationale in Energy Reserves will ensure that
litigation involving home based day care receives separate consid-
eration from those cases on group homes for the mentally ill be-
cause of the different policy concerns. 10 In many instances, the
rights of the other property owners would be unduly sacrificed be-
cause the state is impairing their private right to contract either
without a compelling interest or to a greater extent than necessary.
Part I explains the background of restrictive covenants as they
apply to group homes and also analyzes the importance of courts'
interpretations of the terms found within the covenants. It outlines
the Contract Clause analysis, a factor frequently mentioned in re-
strictive covenant cases, that is set forth by the Supreme Court in
Energy Reserves." Finally, it explains the effect of the Fair Hous-
ing Act ("FHA") on this type of litigation. Part II summarizes the
7. The right to enforce a restrictive covenant may be conceived as a property
right as well as a contractual right. See Barrett v. Dawson, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct.
App. 1998) (addressing the abrogation of the covenant as a taking of property issue as
well as a contractual concern). This Note will only address a restrictive covenant as a
contractual right because Energy Reserves states the appropriate test. See infra Part
I.D. In addition, a restrictive covenant is the functional equivalent of a negative ease-
ment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a negative ease-
ment as an "easement which restrains a landowner from making certain use of his
land which he might otherwise have lawfully done but for that restriction and such
easements arise principally by express grant or by implication"). See also infra note
13.
8. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 410-12.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
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cases involving restrictive covenants and group homes. It also re-
views litigation involving restrictive covenants and family day care
homes. Part III contends that the Contract Clause analysis should
be used in all cases involving group homes for child day care. This
Note concludes that while it seems that the FHA is becoming the
best tool to litigate cases involving covenants and group homes for
the mentally ill, the Contract Clause is a tool that must be used to
address cases involving child day care homes. The Contract Clause
should be used where a court has found a violation of the restric-
tive covenant but considers whether to abrogate the covenant be-
cause of public policy in favor of these child day care homes or
because of a state statute on point. This analysis guarantees that all
parties will have their rights adequately examined.
I. HISTORY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AS THEY APPLY TO
GROUP HOMES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE
A. Background of the Conflict Surrounding
Restrictive Covenants
Many community living arrangements operate through a series
of covenants.'2 Community members' leases or ownership agree-
ments contain limiting language on how the property may be used
and who may use it. Restrictive covenants limit the use of the
property by acting as private contracts between the parties to in-
crease the value of the land.13 Restrictions that appear in subdivi-
sions and condominiums are often as effective as zoning for
controlling land use.' 4
Typically, covenants in residential subdivisions and condomini-
ums restrict the property to residential use only for single family
dwellings and thus, cause discord between the operators of the
12. See Mark Pearlstein, Slammed Shut: Condo Board Can End Open-Door Policy
For Unit's Business Traffic, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1998, at 4.
13. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1315 (defining a restrictive
covenant as a "contract between grantor and grantee which restricts grantee's use and
occupancy of land; generally, purpose behind restrictive covenants is to maintain or
enhance value of lands adjacent to one another by controlling nature and use of sur-
rounding lands").
14. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973) (discussing alterna-
tives to zoning as means to regulate land use such as covenants and nuisance law).
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group homes and their surrounding neighbors. 15 For instance, in
cases involving group homes for the mentally ill, the operators wish
to establish group homes in residential surroundings to enable the
residents to reach their full intellectual potential and not be iso-
lated from society in an institutional setting.16 The neighbors, how-
ever, often worry about common disruptions to the neighborhood,
including traffic and noise. They also worry about potential law-
suits brought against the homeowners' association if any problems
occur.17 For this reason, litigation often arises when the homes'
activities become noticeable outside the boundaries of the home or
the neighbors are worried about declining property values.' 8
B. Importance of Protecting Contractual Rights of Private
Property Owners
Private property owners are in great need of secure contractual
relationships today because, in the past, condominium owners
could rely on enforcement of zoning laws to protect their rights.
Now, "zoning laws are being relaxed to allow for businesses that
don't disturb the neighborhood" or at least are held to be tolerable
by the overall political community.' 9 Restrictive covenants that are
found in condominiums' bylaws and in homeowners' agreements
15. See, e.g., Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 854 P.2d 1072, 1073
(Wash. 1993) (en banc) ("All lots or tracts in Mains Farm shall be designated as 'Res-
idence Lots,' and shall be used for single family residential purposes only.").
16. See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Applicability and Application of Zoning Regula-
tions to Single Residences Employed For Group Living of Mentally Retarded Persons,
Annotation, 32 A.L.R.4TH 1018 (1984) (citing Lippencott, "A Sanctuary for People":
Strategies for Overcoming Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31
STAN. L. REV. 767 (1979)).
17. See Mary McAleer Vizard, Resolving the Business-in-Condo Question, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 10 (Real Estate), at 5; see also Sam Hankin, Covenants A
Source of Conflict: Community Bylaws Land Many in Court, WASH. POST, June 11,
1988, at El. The importance of these covenants is becoming more and more apparent
as the number of homeowner and condominium associations increase. The rise of
covenants in ownership agreements could be explained by shrinking budgets of local
governments which once took care of community facilities. Homeowner's associa-
tions were formed, not to enforce covenants, but to care for many of the facilities
found in these communities. As a natural progression, however, the homeowners
must also maintain their own property, so more restrictions are added to keep prop-
erty values high.
18. See Roy Bragg, Texas Judge Won't Allow Home For Mentally Retarded Wo-
men, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1993, at A21; Pearlstein, supra note 12, at 4; Vizard,
supra note 17, at 5 ("When there's a complete prohibition against business, it's often
only used when there's intrusiveness, and not in other cases."). For a discussion of
selective enforcement of restrictive covenants, see Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574,
577-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
19. Vizard, supra note 17, at 5.
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provide a method for these neighbors to regulate and enforce the
use of their land without relying on the municipality.
There are ways to amend the bylaws and agreements, however, if
the members of these sub-communities no longer agree with the
limitations.2 0 Restrictive covenants within these agreements are
not a permanent ban on the use of property. If the need for change
becomes so great within a community, a majority vote of the own-
ers can alter the agreement.2' Therefore, a private property
owner's contractual rights will be upheld in order to guarantee that
the property will remain within the boundaries of restrictive cove-
nant unless the sub-community finds those boundaries no longer
appropriate.
C. Interpreting Terms in Restrictive Covenants May Allow the
Courts Never To Consider the Constitutional Question
When litigation does arise, state courts take many factors into
account when deciding how restrictive covenants should apply to
group homes. One important factor is the interpretation of the
terms found within the restrictive covenants. If the courts engage
in a broad reading of the terms, such that the group homes do not
violate the covenant, they eliminate issues regarding the enforce-
ability of the covenant and constitutional violations. For example,
if the court holds that the home's use as a day care meets the terms
set forth in the covenant, then there is no need for the operator to
raise, or the judge to discuss, whether public policy allows opera-
tion of the home.22 This reading also negates the neighbors' ability
to raise an impairment of contracts argument.2 3 On the other
hand, if the terms are read narrowly, the case becomes more com-
plex. The court will have to consider the actual meaning of the
terms, balance the rights of all property owners, determine the pol-
icy reasons both for and against enforcing the covenants, and dis-
cern any constitutional issues. These difficult tasks could dissuade
a judge from opening a potential Pandora's box.
20. See id. (noting that state law governs the majority vote needed for approval of
a change which usually requires two-thirds of the owners).
21. See id.
22. See Terrien v. Zwit, 605 N.W.2d 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). For further discus-
sion, see infra Parts II.C and III.B.
23. See, e.g., Turner v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 772 P.2d 628 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a group home for eight developmentally disabled individuals did
not violate the restrictive covenant).
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All restrictive covenants, however, are to be read according to
their ordinary meaning.24 Furthermore, if the language is unclear,
the covenant should be interpreted against the grantor and in favor
of the free enjoyment of land .2  Despite these guidelines, state
courts have interpreted similar terms in similar covenants in vary-
ing ways. For example, "family" has been defined as occupants in
a single dwelling who do not need to be related by blood and only
must live as a single-family unit.26 Other courts have held that the
occupants must be related by blood or marriage as the word "fam-
ily" is commonly known. Texas courts take a different approach
and hold that terms that refer to single family dwelling deal only
with the architectural structure of the building.28 Thus, the courts'
interpretations of the terms in the restrictive covenants can have a
crucial impact on the focus of the case.
Similarly, state courts also interpret the "residential use" term
found in restrictive covenants in differing manners. Often courts
look to the amount of traffic or noise created by the activity to
determine whether the residential atmosphere of the neighborhood
is maintained.29 Some courts, however, find violations of the "resi-
dential use" covenant only when the appearance of the dwelling is
substantially altered for a business use.3 ° Other courts look to
whether the business is of any inconvenience to the surrounding
property owners to determine a violation of the covenant. 31 As
with the single family term, the residential term in ownership
agreements can be interpreted broadly so as not to find conflict
with the restrictive covenant, thereby avoiding any issues as to
24. See Mains Farm, 854 P.2d at 1074; Hill v. Community of Damien, 911 P.2d 861,
866 (N.M. 1996); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484, 485 (S.C.
1991).
25. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 866.
26. See id. at 863 (interpreting single family requirement to include a group of not
more than five people living together).
27. See, e.g., Adult Group Properties Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 467 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987); Mains Farm, 954 P.2d at 1074 (holding that a group home for four elderly
people that makes a profit is not a single family home).
28. See Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Mental Health and Mental Retardation Servs. v. Kin-
near, 877 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Collins v. City of El Campo,
684 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)).
29. See Pearlstein, supra note 12, at'4.
30. See Daniels Gardens, Inc. v. Hilyard, 49 A.2d 721, 725 (Del. Ch. 1946) (using
the test of whether the changes leave "the building in the same general character as a
dwelling"); Jordan v. Orr, 71 S.E.2d 206, (Ga. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that a conver-
sion of a room in the basement to a second kitchen did not violate the residential
purpose of the covenant banning apartment houses).
31. See 20 AM. JUR. 2 D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 177 (1995).
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whether public policy allows such a covenant to be enforced or
whether voiding the covenant would raise constitutional concerns.
D. The Contract Clause
Although other constitutional issues arise during litigation be-
tween group homes and homeowners' associations,32 the Contract
Clause is particularly relevant because it governs the extent to
which a state can interfere with a private contract.33 The Contract
Clause sets the limits for states' inference, and judges often apply it
to these cases to determine whether states have exceeded these
boundaries. It preserves the right of all private contractual parties.
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o
State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts .... ,34 Many state constitutions contain a similar provision
and are usually interpreted identically to the federal guarantee.35
The purpose of the Contract Clause is to "protect the expectations
of persons who enter into a contract from the danger of subsequent
legislation."36 In group home cases, the Contract Clause has been
raised in some circumstances by the neighbors of the group homes
as a defense when public policy threatens to deny enforcement of
the restrictive covenant.37 In effect, the Contract Clause may
counter the operator's defense that the covenant is against public
policy.
32. See Barrett v. Dawson, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998) (involving a re-
strictive covenant as applied to a day care home where the neighbors raised issues of
eminant domain); Hall v. Butte Home Health, Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246 (Ct. App.
1997) (concerning a restrictive covenant as applied to group homes for the elderly
where the neighboring homeowners claimed violation of due process); Shaver v.
Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 577-78 (Tex. App. 1981) (regarding enforcement of a restric-
tive covenant as applied to a group home for the severely handicapped where the
homeowners in a subdivision raised equal protection concerns).
33. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
35. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 708 (1998). "For purposes of deter-
mining whether a law has impaired the obligation of a contract, an appellate court
gives the state and federal contract clauses the same effect." Id. at n.27 (citing Caritas
Servs., Inc. v. Department of Soc. and Health Servs., 869 P.2d 28 (Wash. 1994)).
36. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 708.
37. See Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 1991) (holding that retro-
active application of Indiana statute voiding restrictive covenants that prohibit occu-
pation of mentally ill persons in a residential facility for any reason is constitutionally
prohibited); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group,
460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that the Contract Clause is not violated because
the state had a strong interest in the placement of mentally disabled persons in resi-
dential surroundings).
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Although the text of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, the
inherent police power of the states "to safeguard the vital interests
of its people" allows state legislatures to abrogate private contracts
in certain circumstances.38 In Energy Reserves, the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the Contract Clause to present a three-step test
that determines whether the state interference is constitutional.39
First, a court must determine whether there has been any impair-
ment to a private contract, and, if so, the court must then evaluate
the degree of the impairment."0 When substantial impairment is
found, the court must then look to whether there is a significant
and legitimate public purpose behind the state regulation at issue."
Finally, if the court identifies a significant and legitimate public
purpose behind the statute, it must address whether the means by
which the state attempts to regulate are appropriately tailored to
the identified public purpose.42
The Contract Clause analysis can be applied in two situations
when the courts refuse to enforce restrictive covenants applying to
group or family day care homes. First, if there is a state statute
directly on point that bars enforcement of restrictive covenants as
they apply to group homes, courts can uphold the statute and allow
the group home to continue to operate in the neighborhood. 3 Sec-
ond, courts may act without a state statute directly on point, refus-
ing enforcement and grounding their act of discretion in the public
policy in favor of the operation of the group home." In either situ-
38. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410
(1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)); see
also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 708 ("[T]he federal constitutional protec-
tion against the impairment of the obligation of contracts is no greater than other
guarantees in the Constitution, and the constitutional prohibition of the passage of
laws impairing the obligation of contracts cannot be construed to prohibit the exercise
by the state legislature of its other constitutional powers.").
39. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 410-12 (analyzing a claim brought by a natural
gas supplier seeking determination that it had a right to terminate two contracts be-
cause of the public utility's refusal to redetermine price).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See infra Part II.B. Most cases relied upon by this Note do not directly cite to
a state statute that precludes enforcement of the covenants but instead rely on judicial
impairments of the contract to find a violation of the Contract Clause. There has
been much debate on whether judicial impairment of a contract is enough to trigger
the protection of the Contract Clause because the text in the clause explicitly speaks
to the passage of laws. Some commentators state that the Supreme Court did apply
the Contract Clause to judicial actions for a period in U.S. history, but now the Court
only interprets the clause to apply to impairment of contracts through legislation. See
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ation, however, the private contract is being impaired, and the
Contract Clause analysis is relevant.45
E. The Fair Housing Act and Its Effect on the Cases Involving
Group Homes for the Mentally IlI
Although the state courts have split on the proper way to handle
restrictive covenants as they apply to group homes for the mentally
ill, the enactment of the FHA has halted much of the questions
surrounding these cases. The FHA forbids discrimination in hous-
ing and demonstrates a national policy in favor of deinstitutionaliz-
ing disabled individuals.46  This statute "prohibit[s] special
restrictive covenants or other terms or conditions, or denials of ser-
vice because of an individual's handicap and which ... exclud[e],
for example, congregate living arrangements for persons with
handicaps."47 The FHA halted the jurisprudence because it is a
federal statute that surpasses any provisions within a state's consti-
tution, and the Contract Clause does not apply to the federal gov-
ernment.48 While the issue of whether a restrictive covenant can
prohibit the operation of group homes for the mentally ill was ren-
Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity And Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1055, 1075 n.121 (1997); Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial
Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
35, 51 n.66 (1997).
On the other hand, an argument can be made that judicial impairments of private
contracts should also be invalidated by the Contract Clause. Judicial decisions can
impair contracts to the same degree as statutes. In addition, when the Constitution
was adopted, legislatures were the only lawmaking bodies. Now, modern courts
clearly make as well as interpret the law. Finally, the case law tends to favor not
extending the Contract Clause to judicial decisions but it is not conclusive. See Henry
N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK.
L. REV. 767, 794 n.115 (1989). For a detailed analysis, see Barton H. Thompson Jr.,
The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine" and Its Lessons for the Contract
Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (1992).
45. See infra Parts II.A-B.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1999). The Fair Housing Act does not violate the Contract
Clause because the clause is only a limitation on the power of the states. The Con-
tract Clause does not apply to the federal government, and no clause within the Con-
stitution forbids Congress or the federal government from impairing the obligation of
contracts so long as they are acting within the scope of their powers. See 16B AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 710 (1998).
47. United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp 1555, 1561 (D. Kan. 1992) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 100-711, at 23-24 (1988)).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme
Law of the Land"); see also supra note 46.
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dered moot by the FHA, lessons have been learned from the litiga-
tion which can be applied to cases involving group family day care.
H. CASES INVOLVING GRouP HOMES AND THE SHIFf TO
CASES INVOLVING FAMILY DAY CARE HOMES
A. When State Legislation Bars Enforcement of Restrictive
Covenants as They Apply to Group Homes for the
Mentally Ill
If a state statute exists that directly prohibits the application of
the covenant, courts should apply a Contract Clause analysis when
determining the effect of a restrictive covenant on a group home
because there is an obvious legislative action. In Clem v. Christole,
Inc.,n9 the Indiana Supreme Court decided a case based on a state
statute and brought by residential subdivision property owners
against developers of group homes for developmentally disabled
persons in favor of the subdivision owners.50 The court stated that
the impairment of the restrictive covenant did not fall within the
police powers exception to the Contract Clause,51 and the Indiana
statute that precludes restrictive covenants barring residential use
of property as a facility for the developmentally disabled was un-
constitutional according to the state's constitution. 52
The Indiana Supreme Court recognized a violation of the state
Contract Clause in the retroactive application of a statute voiding
restrictive covenants that prohibit mentally ill persons from occu-
pying a residential facility for any reason. The court reasoned that
this statute did not fall within the necessary police power exception
because of the absence of societal necessity.53 The court stated that
49. 582 N.E.2d at 781. The Indiana statute stated:
A restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or covenant in a subdivision
plat, deed, or other instrument of, or pertaining to, the transfer, sale, lease,
or use of property that would permit the residential use of property ... as a
residential facility for developmentally disabled or mentally ill person: (1) on
the ground that the residential facility is a business; (2) on the ground that
the persons residing in the residential facility are not related; or (3) for any
other reason; is, to the extent of the prohibition, void as against public policy
of the state.
Ind.Pub.L. No. 9-1991, § 98.
50. See Clem, 582 N.E.2d at 784-85.
51. See id. at 784 ("Only those statutes which are necessary for the general public
and reasonable under the circumstances will withstand the Contract Clause. It is only
this latter necessary police power, rather than the general police power, which pro-
vides the exception to the Contract Clause.").
52. See id.
53. See id.
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if "the police power exception is construed too broadly, it would
operate to eviscerate the constitutional protection."54
The court distinguished between the state's general and its nec-
essary police power required by the Contract Clause to determine
that the statute was "not reasonably necessary for the protection of
the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. ' 55 To support
this holding, the court reasoned that the effect of the statute was
permanent, irrevocable and retroactive in changing the contractual
obligations found in the covenants between the parties. 6 The
court also noted that the purposes of restrictive covenants found in
ownership agreements were consistent with the general welfare of
the public because they promoted protection, peace, and well-be-
ing of all the neighbors within the community. 7
Although the statute involved in Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York/
Long Island County Services Group58 was not directly on point, the
court acknowledged that legislative action caused them to deny en-
forcement of the covenant. 59 In Crane Neck, a homeowners' asso-
ciation commenced a legal action against agencies that operated
leased homes for caring and housing eight severely retarded adults,
alleging a violation of the restrictive covenant prohibiting construc-
tion or maintenance of other than single-family dwellings.60 The
neighbors argued that a "court may not refuse to enjoin violation
of the restrictive covenant on public policy grounds because it is a
private contract which cannot be impaired by the State" based on
54. Id. at 783.
55. Id. at 784.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984). A Long Island estate, started in 1945, was di-
vided into residential sections, and each deed included an identical covenant restrict-
ing buildings to single family dwellings. Agencies leased property within Crane Neck
Farm in 1980 to house and care for mentally retarded adults. The property was situ-
ated on two wooded acres and contained a six-bedroom home. The adults were in
need of constant supervision, so in addition to the resident "house parents," there was
a nonresident professional staff of sixteen persons. In a family-type environment and
under constant supervision, the mentally retarded adults were taught basic skills and
socialization. The adults would be staying at the home for an indeterminate amount
of time, but the goal of the program was to allow the adult to reach a certain level of
independence so he may leave and be replaced by another in need of supervision.
The other Crane Neck Farm property owners sought a judgment enforcing the cove-
nant and enjoining continuation of the lease. See id. at 1337-38.
59. See id. Section 41.34(f) of New York's Mental Hygiene Law states "[a] com-
munity residence established pursuant to this section and family care homes shall be
deemed a family unit, for purposes of local laws and ordinances." N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1999).
60. See Crane Neck, 460 N.E.2d at 1337-38.
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the Constitution.61 The New York Court of Appeals did not apply
a traditional Contract Clause analysis but still rejected this
argument:
[T]his court has long recognized that the State's interest in pro-
tecting the general good of the public through social welfare leg-
islation is paramount to the interest of parties under private
contracts, and the State may impair such contracts by subse-
quent legislation or regulation so long as it is reasonably neces-
sary to further an important public purpose and the measures
taken that impair the contract are reasonable and appropriate to
effectuate that purpose.62
The Court concluded that the state's interest and means to pro-
mote community residences for the mentally ill were sufficient so
as not to allow private contractual rights to override the state
policy.63
B. When Courts Decide the Application of Restrictive
Covenants to Group Homes Based on Public Policy
Most states, however, do not have a statute directly on point
when they are determining what application a restrictive covenant
should have on a group home.64 Therefore, most courts use their
general discretionary powers to decide the cases based on state
public policy. Under the public policy doctrine, courts generally
have the power to interfere with private contractual rights when
the state's interest in protecting the common good is paramount to
the rights of the parties under private contract.65 When restrictive
covenants have been interpreted to prohibit group homes, state
courts have considered the "social utility of group homes for men-
tally disabled persons and determined that restrictive covenants
should not be enforced against such homes based on public policy
favoring the deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded persons. '66
If the operator of the group home can prove a longstanding public
policy favoring the establishment of group homes for the mentally
ill, state courts may choose not to enforce the restrictive covenants
61. Id. at 1343.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
65. See generally Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 410 (1983); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs.
Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
66. Nora A. Uehlein, Community Residence For Mentally Disabled Persons As Vi-
olation of Restrictive Covenant, Annotation, 41 A.L.R.4TH 1216 (1985).
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because they contravene this policy. 67 Group home operators and
judges use legislative history and state statutes with similar words
as those found in the terms in restrictive covenants to prove the
existence of a state public policy. 68
1. Courts That Have Overridden Restrictive Covenants Based on
Public Policy Concerns
State courts have split, however, on whether public policy con-
cerns can actually preclude enforcement of the restrictive covenant
towards group homes for the mentally ill. 69 In Crane Neck, the
court agreed with the agencies and held that New York's long-
standing public policy (demonstrated through state statutes) for the
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill precluded enforcement of
the restrictive covenant that limited use of the residence to single
family dwellings. 70 The court also concluded that the state's inter-
est in "protecting the welfare of mentally and developmentally dis-
abled individuals is clearly an important public purpose, and the
means used to select the sites ... are reasonable and appropriate to
effectuate the state's program."71 Even though there was no stat-
ute directly on point, the court effectually enacted legislation that
bars the enforcement of these covenants.
Similarly, in 1991, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held, in
Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes,72 that the restrictive covenant
could not be enforced against a group residence for mentally im-
paired adults.73 The case was brought by Frances Rhodes, an
owner of property within a subdivision, seeking a permanent in-
67. See infra Part II.B.1.
68. For example, the New York Legislature enacted section 41.34 of the Mental
Hygiene Law that reads "A community residence established pursuant to this section
and family care homes shall be deemed a family unit for purposes of local laws and
ordinances." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1999). See generally West-
wood Homeowners Ass'n v. Tenhoff, 745 P.2d 976, 978 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(listing 30 state statutes that have been adopted in accordance with the trend towards
deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill).
69. Compare Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs.
Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that New York's longstanding public
policy in favor of group homes for the mentally ill outweighed the interest of private
contractual rights), with Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 1991) (up-
holding restrictive covenant against group home for mentally ill since "statutory im-
pairment of existing restrictive covenants does not fall within the necessary police
power exception to the Contract Clause because of the absence of societal
necessity").
70. See Crane Neck, 460 N.E.2d at 1343.
71. Id.
72. 400 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1991).
73. Id. at 486.
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junction against Palmetto Pathway Homes, a non-profit corpora-
tion, alleging that the use of the property as a home for unrelated
mentally impaired adults was prohibited by the restrictive cove-
nants.74 The court stated that to "prohibit location" of such a
home within their community would be "contrary to public policy
as enunciated by both state and federal legislation. '75 In its opin-
ion, the court looked to the FHA, the purpose of the covenant, and
the public policy in favor of group homes to support their
decision.76
Several appellate level courts also have denied enforcement of
restrictive covenants against group homes for the mentally ill be-
cause of the state's public policy. In Deep East Texas Regional
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services v. Kinnear,77 the
Texas Court of Appeals for the Ninth District decided a case
brought by Joe Kinnear and other unnamed plaintiffs, all property
owners within a subdivision, against Deep East Texas Regional
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services ("DET").78 The
plaintiffs wanted to prohibit DET, under the terms of a restrictive
covenant, from constructing a community home in the subdivision
for six mentally impaired females.79 The court held that Texas has
a "valid and legitimate State governmental interest in protecting
and promoting the public health and welfare of the mentally ill and
74. See id. at 485. The court quoted the relevant section in the restrictive
covenant:
The property hereby conveyed shall not be used otherwise than for private
residence purposes, nor shall more than one residence, with the necessary
outbuildings be erected on any one lot, nor shall any apartment house or
tenement house be erected thereon; nor shall any one lot be subdivided or
its boundary lines changed from the location as shown on said map without
in any one of the cases above enumerated the written consent of the grantor
endorsed on the deed of conveyance thereof.
Id.
75. Id. at 486.
76. See id. at 485-86; see also discussion infra Parts II.B-C.
77. 877 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App. 1994).
78. See id. at 553.
79. See id. The supervision of this home was to be on a twenty-four hour, seven-
day-a-week basis. The restrictive covenant read:
All lots shall be known and described as lots for residential purposes only.
Only one one-family residence may be erected, altered, placed or be permit-
ted to remain on any lot. Said lots shall not be used for business purposes or
[sic] any kind nor any commercial, manufacturing or apartment house
purposes.
Id. at 554. It also stated that "[n]o noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on
upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or become an annoy-
ance or nuisance to the neighborhood." Id.
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the mentally retarded .. . ",80 The court also stated that the "re-
strictive covenants... must yield to the exercise of the State's legit-
imate police power. 81
In Westwood Homeowners Ass'n v. Tenhoff,82 the Arizona Court
of Appeals decided a case brought by a nonprofit homeowner's
association against a residential facility for the developmentally
disabled seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on a viola-
tion of the restrictive covenants within a subdivision agreement.83
The court held that the restrictive covenant was contrary to the
public policy of the state codified in the Arizona Developmental
Disabilities Act.84 The court extended the public policy found in
the statute beyond zoning to include private covenants that pre-
cluded residential facilities in residential neighborhoods. 5
Finally, a Michigan appellate court held in Craig v. Bossenbery8 6
that a restrictive covenant was not enforceable because of strong
public policy supporting residential surroundings for the mentally
ill.8 7 The court traced the state's support of the mentally ill from
the 1908 Constitution to the present day.88 Because of this sup-
80. Id. at 560.
81. Id.
82. 745 P.2d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
83. See id. at 977. The residential facility housed fewer than six developmentally
disabled children and young adults and included an employee who provided them
with parental care. The house was financed by Mesa Association for Retarded Citi-
zens. The restrictive covenant declared in its relevant portions:
No livestock or poultry shall be kept on any of said lots and no store, office,
or other place of business of any kind and no hospital, sanitarium, or other
place for the care or treatment of the sick or disabled, physically or mentally,
nor any theater, saloon or other place of entertainment shall ever be erected
or permitted upon any of said lots, or any part thereof, and no business of
any kind or character whatsoever shall be conducted in or from any resi-
dence on said lots.
Id. at 977-78.
84. See id. at 984. The Act states that residential facilities that care for "six or
fewer persons shall be considered a residential use of the property for all local zoning
ordinances." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-582(a) (1978).
85. See Westwood Homeowners, 745 P.2d at 984.
86. 351 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
87. See id. at 601.
The strong public policy supporting group homes overcomes the public pol-
icy which favors the right of property owners to create restrictive covenants.
We cannot consider the property owners' apparent motives in drafting or
retaining a covenant lest we encourage indirect methods to exclude the
handicapped where blatant, direct methods would clearly fail.
Id.
88. See id. at 599. "Institutions for the benefit of those inhabitants who are deaf,
dumb, blind, feeble-minded or insane shall always be fostered or supported." MICH.
CONST. Of 1908, art. II, § 15 (1908).
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port, the court decided that the "worthy goal" of deinstitutionaliza-
tion should prevail over the right to contract.89
2. Courts That Have Rejected Public Policy Concerns To
Override Covenants
Not all states, however, accept public policy in favor of group
homes for the mentally ill over public policy supporting contractual
rights of property owners. In Omega Corp. of Chesterfield v. Mal-
loy, 90 owners of lots in a subdivision filed suit to restrain Omega
Corp. from using its lots within the subdivision as group homes for
the mentally ill.91 The Virginia Supreme Court held that restrictive
covenants affecting group homes for the mentally ill cannot be
overridden due to the state's public policy in favor of such homes
set forth in zoning ordinances.92 The court based its conclusion on
the private contractual rights in the restrictive covenants and stated
that "Chesterfield's zoning ordinance cannot relieve the lots in
question from the restrictive covenants to which they are
subject."93
Additionally, a Court of Appeals in Texas held that a shelter for
severely handicapped adults violated the restrictive covenant found
in a subdivision's agreement.94 The court stated that selective en-
forcement of the restrictive covenant would not pass constitutional
muster and that the covenant was not unreasonable nor against
public policy.95
In Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington,96 the Su-
preme Court of Washington did not make a definitive ruling re-
89. See Craig, 351 N.W.2d at 599.
90. 319 S.E.2d 728 (Va. 1984).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 729. Omega Corp. of Chesterfield is a nonprofit organization that
owns one lot in each of two subdivisions subject to restrictive covenants. Omega
Corp. intended to build a dwelling on each lot "to provide mentally retarded adults
with normal residential housing in a community setting including the activities and
life-style incident to such a setting." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Both subdivisions,
however, contain covenants that limit the property to residential purposes and single-
family dwellings. See id. "No Lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No
building shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot other than
one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." Id.
93. Id. at 732 (citing Ault v. Shipley, 52 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Va. 1949)).
94. Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
95. See id. at 578-79.
96. 854 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). A homeowners association brought an
action alleging that an adult family home violated a protective covenant that the prop-
erty would be used for single-family residential purposes only. The defendant occu-
pied the residence with four adults who paid her yearly for 24-hour care, seven-days-
a-week. See id.
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garding the effect of public policy and covenants. Instead, the
court reasoned that the interpretation of a certain restrictive cove-
nant should depend on the facts of each case.97 The court did state
that all of the "cases relied upon by the defendant do not support
the bald assertion that public policy invalidates an existing protec-
tive covenant."9 The court continued by noting "[c]ourts should
not equate the concern of zoning laws with the concerns of restric-
tive covenants." 99
C. Prior Treatment of Restrictive Covenants as They Apply to
Group Family Day Care Homes
State courts also have been trying to find an effective way to deal
with restrictive covenants and group day care homes. Deinstitu-
tionalizing the mentally ill and providing safe child care in a resi-
dential setting are both issues that have long been supported by
states' public policies. Family day care in the home is one of the
largest cottage industries in the country.100 It is the primary source
of child care for children under three and is most important for
families where both parents are working and cannot meet the strict
hours day care centers keep.01 Child day care homes, however,
also meet opposition from neighboring homeowners based on re-
strictive covenants that require single family dwellings for residen-
tial use only.112 To make matters more complicated, child day care
homes are not protected by the FHA as are many group homes for
the mentally ill and other homes caring for people with
disabilities.' 03
In Terrien v. Zwit,10 4 a Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
operation of a group family day care did not violate a restrictive
covenant in a subdivision agreement that prohibited all commercial
97. See id. at 1080.
98. Id. The defendant cited such cases as Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City!
Long Island City Servs. Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984), Westwood Homeowners
Ass'n v. Tenhoff, 745 P.2d 976 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), Barrett v. Lipscomb, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 1987), and Turner v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 772 P.2d 628
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
99. Id. (quoting Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Cove-
nants, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 454 (1985)).
100. See Judy Mann, Day Care, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1984, at C1.
101. See id.
102. See Barrett v. Dawson,'71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Quinones
v. Board of Managers, 673 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1998).
103. See Hill v. Community of Damien, 911 P.2d 861 (N.M. 1996).
104. 605 N.W.2d 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
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or business uses of the property. 10 5 The plaintiffs, who were the
other owners of the lots in the subdivision, argued that because the
day care charged a fee, it qualified as a business and therefore vio-
lated the covenant. 0 6 The operator contended that compensation
for services is only one factor to be considered when determining
whether an activity violates a covenant prohibiting commercial use,
and the court agreed. 107 The court did not acknowledge a Contract
Clause concern and relied only on the interpretation of the cove-
nant and public policy in favor of home day care to support its
holding. 0 8
In Barrett v. Dawson,0 9 a California Court of Appeals ruled a
restrictive covenant preventing a family day care center in a neigh-
borhood was void based on a state statute barring such cove-
nants.1' 0 The neighbors argued that denying enforcement of the
restrictive covenant violated the state and federal Contract
Clause."' The court, using the three-step analysis," 2 acknowl-
edged the substantial impairment of the neighbors' contract by the
statute but also recognized "a significant and legitimate public pur-
pose behind the state regulation which voids the enforcement of
the contract right.""11 3 Lastly, the court stated that the statute, be-
cause it was tailored to the promotion of home day care and not
105. See id. at 685.
106. See id. at 684. The subdivision agreement contained three relevant covenants:
1. No part of any of the premises above described may or shall be used for
other than private residential purposes....
3. No lot shall be used except for residential purposes....
14. No part of parcel of the above-describes premises shall be used for any
commercial, industrial, or business enterprises nor the storing of any equip-
ment used in any commercial or industrial enterprise.
Id. at 682.
107. See id. (stating that a court can also look to the nature of the activities on the
property).
108. See id.
109. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998). Neighbors filed suit to enforce the re-
strictive covenant to close down a family day care home operating in their neighbor-
hood. The restrictive covenant prohibited commercial and business activity on the
property. See id. at 900.
110. See id. The statute states that a "restriction or prohibition entered into,
whether by way of covenant, condition upon use or occupancy, or upon transfer of
title to real property, which restricts or prohibits directly, or indirectly limits, the ac-
quisition, use, or occupancy of such property for a family day care home for children
is void." See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1597.40(c) (West 2000).
111. See Barrett, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902-03.
112. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
113. Barrett, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (quotation marks omitted) (stating that "ade-
quate and local day care for working parents is probably about as broad a public
purpose as any that might be imagined in the regulatory universe").
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commercial kindergarten, satisfied the final step requiring charac-
ter appropriate means. 114
Where there is not a specific statute that voids restrictive cove-
nants prohibiting group family day care homes, an operator of such
a group home can argue that pure public policy within the state
requires denying enforcement of the covenant. A New York court
held in 1998 that enforcement of a restrictive covenant, as applied
to a group family day care home, violated public policy. 115 The
court, however, did not use the three-step Contract Clause analy-
sis, but instead relied only on the state's public policy to support its
decision, which it considered analogous to Crane Neck." 6 In addi-
tion, the court cited only to a social services law addressed to local
municipalities and to two instances of support within the legislature
for home day care to uphold their decision that private parties can-
not hinder the operation of a day care through a covenant.117
Il. APPLYING THE CONTRACT CLAUSE TO RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS AND GROUP HOMES FOR CHILD DAY
CARE: A NECESSARY ANALYSIS
A. The Contract Clause Analysis: Restoring the Private
Contractual Rights of Individuals
The constitutional issue of impairment of private contracts by
the state must be addressed when covenants are abrogated either
by legislative or judicial action. Both the police power doctrine
used by legislatures and the public policy doctrine used by the
courts find their roots in the Contract Clause. If either doctrine is
invoked to void a restrictive covenant, the three-step analysis cre-
ated by the Supreme Court in Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas
114. See id.
115. See Quinones v. Board of Managers, 673 N.Y.S.2d 450, 454 (App. Div. 1998).
See supra note 44 for a discussion on the application of the Contract Clause to judicial
impairment of contracts.
116. See Quinones, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 452-54.
117. See id. The New York State law provides that no local municipality may:
[A]dopt or enact any law, ordinance, rule or regulation which would impose,
mandate or otherwise enforce standards for sanitation, health, fire safety or
building construction on a one or two family dwellings or multiple dwelling
used to provide group family day care ... than would be applicable were
such child day care not provided on the premises [and that] no local govern-
ment may prohibit use of a single family dwelling ... for ... group family
day care where a permit for such use has been issued in accordance with
regulations issued pursuant to this section.
Id. at 452 (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 390(12) (Consol. 1999)).
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Power & Light Co. 1 1 8 should be applied." 9 When courts use the
public policy doctrine to override restrictive covenants, they are, in
fact, wrongly presupposing that there is no potential constitutional
violation of the Contract Clause.
To allow an impairment of a contract by the state judiciary, but
not by the state legislature, is differentiating merely between which
branch of the state government impairs the contractual relation-
ship and not whether such an impairment is constitutional. Crane
Neck Ass'n v. New York/Long Island County Services Group120 ex-
emplifies that judicial impairment, based on the public policy doc-
trine, affects a contract just as substantially as state legislative
action.12 ' The court in Crane Neck applied an analysis that is simi-
lar to the Energy Reserves test even in the absence of a statute
directly on point.
Furthermore, if judicial action is not sufficient to trigger the
Contract Clause analysis, the state legislatures are able to shirk
their duty of considering the effects of their legislation by merely
encouraging a policy in favor of home day care. When the state
legislature does not directly abrogate restrictive covenants prohib-
iting family day care, it is passing the obligation onto the judiciary
to determine whether the abrogation is constitutional. If the judici-
ary is not required to decide whether the abrogation violates the
Contract Clause, then the state can bypass the Constitution and
impair the rights of privately contracting parties.
The use of the Energy Reserves analysis will allow each state in-
tervention of a private contractual relationship to be fully ex-
amined. It also will ensure that the private property owners'
interests are being compared to those of the state's in supporting
operation of child day care homes and not being compared to the
state's interest in operating group homes for the mentally ill.
The Contract Clause analysis should thus be used as a method to
determine whether state action is appropriate, because if the state
courts look only to the existence of public policy, the courts will
have too much discretionary power. Restrictive covenants could
be overridden when only a low level of policy exists, or simply
voided when a less extreme result could have been possible. For
example, the courts could tailor their decision to deny enforcement
of a restrictive covenant based on the number of children in the
118. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
119. See supra Part I.D.
120. 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
121. See supra Part II.B.
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day care or based on the proximity of the day care to other neigh-
bors. The courts also could decide to enforce the restrictive cove-
nants prospectively but deny abrogation of the covenants
retrospectively. Even if courts would reach the same result without
applying the Energy Reserves test, the neighbors would have been
assured that through this analysis, their constitutional rights would
not have been violated or only nominally considered. 122
Private property owners cannot always rely on zoning laws or
changes in bylaws within their community groups to uphold their
rights.123 Entering into an agreement that contains a restrictive
covenant that prohibits commercial use of the property is a volun-
tary decision because not all land is governed by these cove-
nants.1 2 4 The operators of day care homes choose property that is
close to other property, that is desirable, and that carries limita-
tions on its use. Presumably, the market price of the land reflected
these qualities. If the restrictive covenants are unfair or depreciate
the value of the land, then a majority of the owners can revise
them. Additionally, the operators of the family day care homes
may be benefiting from the restrictive covenants. The day care
may be more marketable because of the preferred residential set-
ting. The day care is profiting from the prohibition on the property
owners by disregarding the covenant. Therefore, a private prop-
erty owner's contractual rights need to be upheld in order to dis-
able the freerider and to guarantee that the property will remain
within the boundaries of the restrictive covenant and still be effi-
cient. The best way to secure this right is through a fair method of
analysis within the courts using the Contract Clause.
B. Distinguishing Litigation Between Group Homes for the
Mentally IIl and Group Homes for Child Day Care
Although courts do not often use the Contract Clause to decide
cases for the mentally ill, when they employ this method of analy-
sis, each party receives a full consideration of its interests. The
Contract Clause analysis should be extended to cases involving
group homes for child day care to ensure the effective examination
122. See Vizard, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that private property owners need
contractual relationships because, in the past, condominium owners could rely on en-
forcement of zoning laws to protect their rights, but now zoning laws are being re-
laxed to allow for businesses that do not disturb the neighborhood).
123. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
124. Most property in small towns is unrestricted. Therefore, property that is not
subjected to covenants limiting business use can still be used for home day care with-
out any complaints from neighbors. See Bragg, supra note 18, at A21.
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of all the parties' rights. The cases on group homes for the men-
tally ill, however, do not provide strong precedent because the
cases were quite inconsistent, and the doctrine was never fully de-
veloped due to the passing of the FHA. 15 Therefore, the doctrine
on group homes for the mentally ill was preempted by the FHA
before it was settled among the states, and, although it may provide
a starting point for analysis, it is not an effective comparison for
group family day care homes.
Even if the Contract Clause analysis was being utilized in all
cases involving family day care, states must concede that their in-
terest is different with respect to group homes for the mentally ill
and for child day care. For instance, residents of group homes for
the mentally ill live in those homes full time, while children in day
care have independent homes separate from the day care resi-
dence. A state's interest in promoting the deinstitutionalization of
the mentally ill is greater because the group homes provide a per-
manent residential atmosphere. The family day care homes, how-
ever, only provide a day time residential atmosphere. The
neighbors of permanent residences experience greater effects, such
as noise, that could be used as a justification for regulation of the
homes for the mentally ill by the state.
In addition, the liability issues differ between family day care
homes and group homes for the mentally ill. Group homes for the
mentally ill could be liable for the actions of their residents because
the homes have assumed a special relationship with the re-
sidents. 26 This increased liability could provide greater support
for the state's interest in the regulation towards group homes for
the mentally ill. Because of these reasons, a court should not abro-
gate the restrictive covenant as it applies to a family day care home
because the court had previously denied enforcement of a cove-
nant as it applied to a home for the mentally ill. An undeveloped
doctrine should not be extended to cases where different interests
exist without the necessary constitutional analysis.
125. See supra Part I.E
126. "There is no duty.., to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relationship exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965).
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C. Why Quinones, Barrett and Terrien Ineffectively Analyze
Restrictive Covenants As They Apply to Family Day
Care Homes
Quinones v. Board of Managers2 7 is an insufficient determina-
tion of whether a court should deny enforcement of a restrictive
covenant as it applies to a group home for family day care because
the court fails to apply the Energy Reserves test and fails to show
significant public policy that is unique to family day care. The New
York Social Services Law to which the court refers is particularly
addressed to local governments not imposing regulations or limita-
tions on a dwelling merely because the dwelling is used for home
day care. 28 Restrictive covenants found in a condominium's by-
laws, however, apply to every member in the condominium. No
extra limitations are placed on the day care operators as compared
to the other members and, therefore, it should not violate the so-
cial services law.
In addition, the court fails to take into account the differences
between this case and Crane Neck.'29 Specifically, in Quinones, the
parties live in a condominium. Crane Neck involved separate sin-
gle-family homes. Residents in condominiums should have more
control over the use of the units because of the close proximity to
the other residents. If the court had used the Energy Reserves test,
the court may have required the operator to make more of a show-
ing that the covenant should be abrogated.
Terrien v. Zwit130 does not mention the Contract Clause and in-
terprets the covenant broadly, preventing a day care home from
qualifying as a business despite compensation for the operators.131
Although the outcome may be the same whether the court chooses
to interpret the terms in the covenant narrowly or broadly, the
courts should be honest about the basis for their decisions. It is
perfectly legitimate to read terms in a covenant broadly when the
precedent in certain states support liberal interpretations of cove-
nants. A court should not, however, avoid a constitutional issue
merely by its arbitrary interpretation.
While the court applies the Energy Reserves test in Barrett v.
Dawson,32 the court impairs the covenant with little analysis. The
127. 673 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1998).
128. See supra note 118.
129. See supra Part III.B for further discussion.
130. 605 N.W.2d 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
131. See supra Part I.C.
132. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998).
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court states that "local day care is as broad a public purpose as any
that might be imagined in the regulatory universe. ' 133 This state-
ment demonstrates the ease at which a court can find a significant
public purpose of the state. The effectiveness of the Energy
Reserves test is greatly diminished when judges can validate their
abrogation of covenants based only on their opinions regarding im-
portant state objectives.
D. Illustration of Applying the Energy Reserves Test to a Case
Involving a Group Family Day Care Home
Quinones exemplifies a court not acknowledging the Contract
Clause and simply bootstrapping the issues regarding group homes
for child day care to those involving the mentally ill.1 34 For exam-
ple, if the court had applied the Energy Reserves test, it may have
reached a different result. First, a substantial impairment of the
contract, namely the restrictive covenant, definitely existed here
because the covenant could not be enforced against the operators
of the day care home. Because the impairment of the contract here
was severe, the state action must be subjected to an increased level
of scrutiny. 35 Second, because the state action constituted sub-
stantial impairment of the contractual relationship, the state must
then identify a significant and legitimate public purpose, such as
remedying a broad and general social economic problem, to justify
the impairment.'36 Here, the state has an interest in providing qual-
ity day care to children within a residential setting. This interest
certainly qualifies as a broad problem that affects many citizens.
Finally, the court must determine whether the change in the
rights of the contracting parties is of a character appropriate to the
public purpose that justifies the state action banning the restrictive
covenant. 37 When state legislation adjusts the rights of the con-
tracting parties, the courts must properly defer to the legislature as
the arbiter of the necessity and reasonableness of the regulation.
When no state statute exists and the judiciary is taking the action,
such as in Quinones, the court's conduct must be necessary and
reasonable. According to at least one state supreme court, com-
pletely barring enforcement of the restrictive covenant is not rea-
133. Id. at 903.
134. See id.
135. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411 (1983) (citing to Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245
(1978)).
136. See id. at 411-12.
137. See supra Part I.D.
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sonably necessary for the welfare of the general public.138 Denying
the enforcement of a restrictive covenant is a permanent adjust-
ment of the contractual relationship between the parties. 139 In ad-
dition, these types of covenants have not traditionally been
regulated or altered by the state.14 °
The court could have taken less extreme measures. Specifically,
the court could have prospectively banned restrictive covenants
that prohibited family day care. It is likely that a different result
could have been reached by the court had it done the suggested
analysis. The Quinones court only considered one social services
law and a few legislative statements to support New York's interest
in residential child day care. This cited information does show that
the state had an interest in this service,14' but it is not identified as
a "longstanding public policy."'1 42 Moreover, it is also not clear
from this information that these restrictive covenants "pose the
same deterrent to the effective implementation of the state
policy.' 43
CONCLUSION
In the litigation surrounding restrictive covenants and group
homes for child day care, the Contract Clause analysis, specifically
the one found in Energy Reserves, should be adopted by courts.
The analysis will ensure that these cases are not being under-ana-
lyzed or that the public policy in favor of group homes for child day
care will not merely be "piggy-backed" on the policy supporting
group homes for the mentally ill. By requiring that the state ac-
tion, either legislatively or judicially, be necessary to a legitimate
governmental purpose, private contractual relationships will still be
respected. It is important to note that just because these restrictive
138. See Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 1991).
139. See id.
140. See id. "In determining the extent of the impairment, we are also to consider
whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the
past." Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978)).
141. See Condominium Board May Not Restrict Right to Use Unit As A Group
Home For Family Day Care, 12 No. 9 N.Y. REAL EST. REP. 2, July 1998 (arguing that
the social services law only extends to municipalities and does not mention private
restrictions). "[A]rguably, residents of a condominium ought to have more control
over how the units are occupied because of the greater interdependence among units
than is common among single-family houses." Id.
142. Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island Servs. Group, 460 N.E.2d
1336 (N.Y. 1984).
143. Id.
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covenants are upheld, it does not prevent family day care homes
for children. These rulings simply preserve the contractual rela-
tionship between the neighbors.14 4
144. See also Bragg, supra note 18, at A21 (noting that not all land is subject to
limitations on commercial use).
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